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January 9, 2003
Utah Court of Appeals
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse
450 S. State, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Re: State v. Grossi, Case No. 20020151-CA
U.R.A.P. 24(i) Letter
Dear Court Clerk:
The State submits this letter to the clerk of the court pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
On page 22 of his opening brief, defendant treated the trial court's finding that he
consented to the officer's entry into the apartment as a conclusion of law reviewed for
correctness. See Aplt. Brf. at 22. Defendant also argued in both his opening brief and reply
brief that evidence of consent may not be ambiguous, but must be clear and unequivocal.
Aplt. Brf. at 24-25; Rply Brf. at 2-3 & n. 1. The State disputed both points in its brief. See
Aple. Brf. at 10-11. On December 20, 2002, the Utah Supreme Court settled these issues in
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at f f 48-50. Reference to Hansen, therefore, is necessary
for a proper determination of the issues in this appeal.
Sincerely,

Jeffrey S. Gray
Assistant Attorney General
cc: Heather Johnson, Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
Lana Taylor, Salt Lake District Attorney's Office
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20020151-CA

ALBERT JAMES GROSSI,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of cocaine, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8{l)(a)(ii)(Supp. 1999). This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly denied defendant's motion
to suppress the evidence seized from his home.
Standard ofReview. 'The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant
or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion
given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910

1

P.2d 1245,1247 (Utah App.),cert. denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996); accord State v. Veteto,
2000UT62,f 8,6 P3d 1133.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant to a
determination of this case. That amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (Supp. 1999), possession
of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), possession ofmarijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia,
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998). R. 2-4.
Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial on all counts. R. 167:
66.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seizedfromhis home. R. 34. Following
an evidentiary hearing, R. 168, the trial court denied defendant's motion and entered findings

2

and conclusions. R. 84-91,102-06. Defendant thereafter pled guilty to an amended count
of possession of cocaine, a third degree felony, and the remaining charges were dismissed.
See R. 119-28. Pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), defendant
conditioned his guilty plea on the right to appeal the trial court's suppression order. See 121.
The court sentenced defendant to a prison term of zero-to-five years, but suspended the
sentence and placed defendant on supervised probation for 36 months.

R. 130-32.

Defendant timely appealed. R. 134.
SUMMARY OF FACTS 1

On November 15,2000, Officers Jason Knight and Perry Beauchaine were dispatched
to a Salt Lake City apartment on a report that a male was assaulting two females. R. 168:4-6
(R. 102: \ 1). As the officers arrived on the scene, Chandra Karren ran up to Officer Knight
yelling that a man was beating up her friend—Andrea Layne. R. 168: 6 (R. 102-03: f 2).
She told Officer Knight that Layne "was being dragged down the stairs by her hair and that
she was six months pregnant." R. 168: 7, 21. She also informed the officer that she heard
Layne within the apartment yelling, "stop hitting me." R. 168: 7.
The two officers descended the stairs to the basement apartment and Officer Knight
knocked on defendant's front door. R. 167: 52; R. 168: 7 (R. 103:13). Defendant peered
out from the darkened apartment through a window panel to the door but did not open the

1

Because the trial court's decision denying the motion to suppress was based on
testimony from both the suppression hearing (R. 168) and the preliminary hearing (R.
167), see R. 84, the State cites to the evidence from both hearings. See also R. 168: 6768. The trial court's findings are cited parenthetically.
3

door. R. 168:7-8,12.2 Because he needed to check on the welfare of Layne and because the
inability to observe defendant's activity behind the door jeopardized the officers' safety,
Officer Knight asked that defendant open the door. R. 168: 8 (R. 103: f 4); see also R. 167:
23. Defendant refused, indicating that he did not want to go to jail. R. 168: 9,22 (R. 103:
U 5). Officer Knight told defendant he would not leave until he verified that Layne was
unharmed. R. 168:9-10. Defendant insisted that she was "fine" and called out to her to tell
Officer Knight that she was "okay." R. 168: 9-10. She did not respond. R. 168: 9-10.
Later, defendant told Officer Knight that Layne was going out a cellar door—a reference not
understood by Knight. R. 168: 10,26,32. Meanwhile, and unbeknownst to Officer Knight,
Officer Beauchaine went to the back of the building after a young woman alerted him that
Layne was trying to exit out the back door. R. 167: 52-53; R. 168: 10. When Knight
realized he was alone, he radioed for additional backup. R. 168: 10-11,31.
After further coaxingfromOfficer Knight, defendant cracked open the door, but still
refused to step out. R. 168: 10. Finally, after ten minutes of negotiation, defendant exited
the apartment, leaving the door ajar, and reluctantly allowed Officer Knight to search him
for weapons. R. 168: 11,14,21-22,32,44 (R. 103: % 6). Officer Beauchaine returned from
the back and assisted Officer Knight in then handcuffing defendant. R. 168: 11-13,42,44.
At that time, he advised Officer Knight that a woman, presumably Layne, had fled the
apartment from a side door. R. 168: 14-15, 27-28, 42-43, 47. The officers escorted

2

The apartment was dark because the power had been shut off. R. 167: 35; R. 168:

33-34.
4

defendant to a patrol car where he was detained while Officer Knight continued his
investigation. SeeR. 168: 13-14.
After interviewing Karren and a second witness, Officer Knight returned to the patrol
car and notified defendant that he was being arrested for interfering with the investigation.
R. 168: 14-16, 59. At that time, defendant told Officer Knight that "[h]e wanted his
apartment locked up and secured." R. 167: 26-27; R. 168: 16, 27, 37, 43 (R. 103: f 7).
Officer Knight would not permit defendant to do so, but indicated that he would lock the
door for him. R. 168: 27, 43-44 (R. 103: t 8); see also R. 168: 60. Upon returning to the
apartment, however, Officer Knight found that he could not lock the door without a key. R.
167: 9; R. 168: 16. Accordingly, he walked back to the patrol car and asked defendant for
the key to the door. R. 167: 9,27, 56-57; R. 168: 16. Defendant told him he did not have
the key but he believed Layne might have it. R. 167:9,57-58; R. 168:16. Again, defendant
requested that the apartment be secured. See R. 167: 58.
Officers Knight and Beauchaine returned to the apartment and stepped inside in an
attempt to secure it (Officer Knight intending to lock thefrontdoor and Officer Beauchaine
intending to lock the back door). R. 167: 58-59; R. 168: 16. As he looked for a way to lock
the door, Karren unexpectedly emergedfromthe bedroom. R. 168: 17, 33-35,42 (R. 103:
U 9); see also R. 167:10-11,30,60. Surprised to find Karren inside and suspecting that she
might be burglarizing the apartment, the officers detained Karren to find out why she was
there. R. 167: 11,60-61; R. 168: 17. Karren explained that she had returned to retrieve her

5

coat, but acted very nervous—much more so than when she first reported the assault to
Officer Knight. R. 167: 11; R. 168: 17.
Concerned that she may have retrieved a weapon, the officers conducted a quick pat
down search. R. 168: 11;R. 168: 17. Then, prompted by Karren's unexpected emergence
from the bedroom, her persistent nervous behavior, and the nature of domestic violence
disputes, Officer Knight conducted a cursory sweep of the apartment to make certain that no
one else was inside and to determine whether the victim of the assault might also have
returned. R. 168: 17, 23-24, 34-37 (R. 103: f 10); see also R. 167: 11-12. Aided by a
flashlight, Officer Knight scanned the bedroom and observed a number of illicit drugs and
paraphernalia in plain view. R. 168: 18-19, 33-34 (R. 103: f 11). The contraband was
thereafter seized and defendant was charged for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia.
R. 2-4; R. 168: 17,19.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence seized from his home following his arrest. Contrary to defendant's claim, Officer
Knight was justified in stepping inside the doorway to lock the door because defendant
consented to the limited entry for the purpose of securing the apartment. In addition,
securing the premises is a legitimate State interest justifying a limited and minimal intrusion.
Officer Knight's subsequent security sweep of the premises was reasonably prompted by Ms.
Karren's unexpected presence in the apartment, her persistent nervous behavior, and the

6

volatile and unpredictable nature of domestic violence disputes. The Court should therefore
affirm the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT SEIZURE OF THE
CONTRABAND WAS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE.
Under the plain view doctrine, incriminating "objects falling in the plain view of an
officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be introduced in evidence." Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct 992, 993
(1968) (per curiam); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S.Ct. 1535,1543 (1983);
see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,465,91 S.Ct. 2022,2037 (1971). "[A]
warrantless seizure is [therefore] justified if: (1) the officer is lawfully present where the
search and seizure occur; (2) the evidence is in plain view; and (3) the evidence is clearly
incriminating." State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1983). The only issue raised by
defendant on appeal is whether Officer Knight was lawfully present in the bedroom doorway
when he observed the contraband. See Aplt. Brf. at 25-27. He does not dispute that the
contraband was in plain view of the officer when he opened the bedroom door, nor does he
dispute the clearly incriminating nature of the contraband.
The plain view doctrine "provides grounds for seizure of an item when an officer's
access to an object has some prior justification under the Fourth Amendment." Brown, 460
U.S. at 738, 103 S.Ct. at 1541; accord Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136, 110 S.Ct.
2301, 2308 (1990). The law is well settled that police entry into a house is justified only if

7

officers "comply[ ] with the warrant requirement or satisfy[ ] one of its recognized
exceptions—e.g., through a valid consent or a showing of exigent circumstances." Soldal
v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56,65-66,113 S.Ct. 538,545-46 (1992). The plain view doctrine
thus encompasses "the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for
specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article of
incriminating character." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465, 91 S.Ct. 2037. Likewise, the seizure
is lawful "[w]here the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an
article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement," e.g., through consent or exigent circumstances. Id.
Police did not have a warrant here. Accordingly, the admissibility of the evidence
turns on whether Officer Knight's presence in the apartment was justified by an exception
to the warrant requirement. In this case, Officer Knight's presence must be justified at two
junctures. He must have been justified in entering the apartment initially and he must have
been justified in proceeding further to the bedroom. Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal,
the officer's presence in the apartment was justified in both instances. Defendant consented
to Officer Knight's initial entry for the limited purpose of securing his apartment. And
although defendant did not consent to further entry, Officer Knight's sweep of the bedroom
was justified by the exigency created by Karren's unexpected presence in the apartment.
A.

DEFENDANT CONSENTED TO THE OFFICERS' LIMITED ENTRY INTO THE
APARTMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING THE APARTMENT.

In upholding the plain view seizure of the contraband, the trial court concluded that
"Officer Knight was justified in entering the defendant's apartment to lock the door because
8

the defendant wanted the apartment secured, but was unable to do it himself as a result of his
arrest." R. 104: f 4; see also R. 89 (concluding in its memorandum decision "that Officer
Knight entered the defendant's apartment lawfully (i.e., by a request), to secure the apartment
(a need which the defendant himself communicated)

"). 3 Defendant contends that the

trial court's determination that defendant consented to the entry was error. Aplt. Brf. at 2125. Defendant's argument fails for two reasons. First, rather than treating the consent
determination as a factual finding, defendant treats it as a legal conclusion subject to the
more stringent correctness standard. See Aplt. Brf. at 22. Second, the trial court's finding
of consent is, contrary to defendant's claim, supported by the evidence introduced at both the
preliminary hearing and suppression hearing.
1. The Trial Court's Finding That Defendant Requested the Officer to
Secure His Apartment Is Reviewed for Clear Error.
A trial court's decision denying a motion to suppress is subject to a bifurcated
standard of appellate review. "The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearlyerroneous standard." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 916
P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). "[T]he legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure
of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." Moreno,
910P.2datl247.

3

The trial court's "Memorandum Decision" is reproduced in Addendum A and the
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" are reproduced in Addendum B.
9

Defendant contends that a trial court's determination of a defendant's consent is a
conclusion of law. Aplt. Brf at 22. However, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Arroyo,
796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), reviewed the trial court's consent determination for clear error.
After observing that a trial court's finding of fact may not be set aside "unless it is clearly
erroneous," the Court held that the "prosecution's assertion [at the suppression hearing] that
consent was given is not evidence and cannot support a finding of consent." Id. at 687.
Thus, the Court held, "the trial court's finding of consent is clearly erroneous." Id.4 The
Arroyo decision therefore establishes that a trial court's determination of consent is not a
legal conclusion as claimed by defendant, but a factual finding "reviewed under the
deferential clearly-erroneous standard." Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1247.
2. The Evidence and the Reasonable Inferences from the Evidence Support the
Trial Court's Finding That Defendant Consented to the Officer's Entry for
the Purpose of Securing His Apartment.
An appellate court will find factual findings clearly erroneous only if "the evidence,
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings
against attack." State v. Moosman, 19A P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). The Court will
therefore "'consider the facts in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination,' and
defer to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility." State v. Mogen, 2002 UT App
235, f 16, 52 P.3d 462 (quoting State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah App. 1996)).

4

A trial court's determination that a consent was voluntary is, on the other hand, a
question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f 42, 37 P.3d
1073. However, defendant has not argued on appeal that any consent given was
involuntary—that is, "'the product of duress or coercion, express or implied.'" Id. at f 47
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973)).
10

Reversal is appropriate only if the "findings so lack support as to be 'against the clear weight
of the evidence/" State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, U 17 n.2,1 P.3d 1108 (citations omitted).
Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances supported the trial court's finding that defendant consented to the entry for
purposes of securing the apartment. At the suppression hearing, Officer Knight testified on
direct examination that he entered the apartment because defendant "wanted his apartment
locked up and secured." R. 168:16. Later, during cross-examination, defense counsel asked:
Okay. Now, at this time you clearly remembered the exact words that
[defendant] used with regard to the statements about wanting you to go in and
secure his apartment for him. I mean this is clear to you. You can clearly
remember it, right?
R. 168: 27 (emphasis added). Officer Knight responded, "I don't know if they're the exact
words but that's what he was want [sicj, yes." R. 168: 27 (emphasis added).
In an attempt to show that he did not ask the officers to secure the apartment,
defendant called one of his former neighbors who testified that defendant asked that he be
allowed to lock the door. R. 168: 60. The neighbor testified that when the officers refused
defendant's request, indicating that they would lock it for him, defendant said, "No, let me
take care of it (inaudible) couple a minutes." R. 168: 60. The trial court, however, expressly
found Officer Knight's testimony "to be credible (based upon his appearance, demeanor and
words)." R. 86 (emphasis in original). The court made no such finding with respect to the
neighbor's testimony. As noted above, this Court will "defer to the trial court's assessment
of witness credibility." Mogen, 2002 UT App 235, at^f 16. Thus, even assuming, arguendo,
that the neighbor's testimony conflicted with Officer Knight's testimony, the appellate court
11

will defer to the trial court's assessment of the evidence. As once observed by this Court,
"[b]ecause 'the truth is rarely pure and never simple,' the trial judge is in the best position
to sift witness credibility and the accuracy of conflicting evidence." State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d
1296, 1299 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted).
The trial court's finding is also supported by other evidence. For example, Officer
Beauchaine's testimony at the preliminary hearing corroborated Officer Knight's testimony
that defendant requested him to secure the apartment. In his examination of Officer
Beauchaine, defense counsel asked: "Did [defendant] ever say please, words to the effect of
'Please go in and lock up my apartment'?" R. 167: 58. In response, Officer Beauchaine
testified that he "believe[d] that there was a specific request by [defendant] because of his
concern that he wanted us to secure the apartment for him." R. 167: 58. Defendant's
conduct in connection with the officers' attempts to secure the apartment also supports a
finding of consent. When Officer Beauchaine returned after discovering the apartment could
not be locked from within, defendant cooperated by giving information concerning the key.
Although he said that he did not have the key, he told officers that Layne might have it. R.
167: 9. There was no testimony that defendant made any protests to the officers' effort to
secure the apartment at that time. See State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385,389 (Utah 1986) (finding
consent to proceed to bedroom where defendant made no objection to officer following him
there). Indeed, the evidence suggests that defendant again requested that the officers secure
his apartment. See R. 167: 58 (Officer Beauchaine testifying to the conversation about the
keys, which occurred after Officer Knight's initial attempt to secure the apartment).

12

Moreover, the neighbor's testimony, when viewed in context, is not inconsistent with
a finding that defendant ultimately requested Officer Knight to secure the apartment for him.
The evidence demonstrates that the neighbor only heard part of the conversation. See R. 168:
60-61 (overhearing only a few comments in a conversation lasting at least a couple of
minutes); R. 168: 59-63 (never recollecting a discussion regarding a key). In addition,
Officer Knight did not entirely discount the possibility that defendant initially requested that
he be allowed to lock the door himself. He did not recall such a conversation, but confirmed
that had defendant requested permission to lock the door himself, he would not have
permitted him to do so. R. 168: 27. This is consistent with the neighbor's testimony. In the
end, however, Officer Knight testified that although he did not remember the exact words of
the conversation, he did recall defendant making the request that he secure the apartment for
him. See R. 168: 16, 27. The reasonable inference from this testimony is that when faced
with the reality that he would not be permitted to lock the apartment himself, defendant
requested the officers to do so. See Moosman, 794 P.2d at 475-76 (drawing all reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the trial court's factual determination).5
Defendant cites to three cases in support of his argument that the evidence did not
support the trial court's consent determination: Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88
S.Ct. 1788 (1968); United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1992); and United
States v. Iribe, 11 F.3d 1553 (10th Cir. 1993). See Aplt. Brf. at 22-24. Defendant's reliance
on these cases is misplaced. The issue in Bumper was whether consent could be lawfully
5

Defendant does not suggest on appeal that he should have been permitted to lock
the door himself.
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obtained after a claim of authority to search. 391 U.S. at 548, 88 S.Ct. at 1791. Theofficers
in this case made no claim of authority to search the apartment. The issue in Salinas-Cano
was whether a consent to search a suitcase could be given by someone other than the owner
of the suitcase. 959 F.2d at 862. There is no claim here that the officers received authority
to secure the apartment from anyone other than defendant. Finally, the primary issue in Iribe
was whether the consent to search the house was coerced. 11 F.3d at 1557. Again, there is
no claim here that police coerced defendant into requesting that officers secure his
apartment.6
3. The Officer's Entry Is Further Justified By the Legitimate Need to Secure
the Premises.
The officers' entry into the apartment is further justified by law enforcement's
legitimate need to secure the premises of an arrestee before he is transported to jail. In South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3099 (1976), the U.S. Supreme
Court observed that it "has consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles
impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing or

6

Defendant also observes that the Tenth Circuit in Iribe "emphasized that consent
must be 'unequivocal and specific/ as well as 'freely and intelligently given/" Aplt. Brf.
at 24 (quoting Iribe, 11 F.3d at 1557). These requirements, however, are part of the
three-part "presumption against waiver" test which was recently rejected by the Utah
Supreme Court, See Bisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 47, 37 P.3d 1073. The Court in Bisner held
that "[wjhen assessing whether consent to a warrantless search was given voluntarily,
courts in Utah must follow the same analysis we have repeatedly applied since
Schneckloth: Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as 'the product of duress or
coercion, express or implied/" Id. (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041).
In making that assessment, the court considers the '"totality of all the surrounding
circumstances.'" Id. (citation omitted). Nothing in the record suggests that the consent
was coerced.
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protecting the car and its contents." The officers' entry here was not into a car, but an
apartment, and did not rise to the level of an inventory of the premises. However, the interest
in securing a home and its contents is no less important than that in securing a car and its
contents.

Cf. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 107 S.Ct. 738, 741 (1987)

(acknowledging that protecting an owner's property while in police custody is a strong
governmental interest). Similarly, "searches" conducted for the purpose of securing property
need not be performed "in a totally mechanical 'all or nothing' fashion." Florida v. Wells,
495 U.S. 1,4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 1635 (1990).
Like inventory searches of a car, steps to secure the home of an arrestee "'serve to
protect an owner's property . . . [and] to ensure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized
property

'" Id. (quoting Bertine, 419 U.S. at 372, 107 S.Ct. at 741). Where the search

or entry was conducted not in the furtherance of a criminal investigation, but in the
furtherance of a routine caretaking function, the policies underlying the warrant requirement
are not implicated. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371,107 S.Ct. at 741. As observed by the high
court in Bertine:
"The standard ofprobable cause is peculiarly related to criminal investigations,
not routine, noncriminal procedures . . . . The probable-cause approach is
unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of routine
administrative caretaking functions, particularly when no claim is made that
the protective procedures are a subterfuge for criminal investigations."
Id. (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 371 n.5, 96 S.Ct. 3092). Thus, the applicable test in
cases not involving the pursuit of crime is reasonableness.
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The State does not suggest that an inventory search, as in the case of an impounded
car, is appropriate. The expectations of privacy in a home are greater than those in an
automobile and a home is not placed in the custody of police. However, taking necessary but
limited measures to secure the home is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In this
case, nothing in the record suggests that Officer Knight's initial entry into the apartment was
but "a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence." Wells, 495
U.S. at 4, 110 S.Ct. at 1635. Rather, the entry was made not only pursuant to defendant's
request, but with the objective to protect defendant's property and in a manner consistent
with Officer Knight's "established routine" in securing the premises. Id.; R. 167:37; R. 168:
41. Such limited action does not offend the Fourth Amendment.
B.

THE CURSORY SWEEP OF THE APARTMENT WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE NEED TO
ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE OFFICERS AND THE VICTIM.

While defendant consented to the officers' entry for purposes of securing the
apartment, he did not consent to further entry. Accordingly, Officer Knight's entry into the
bedroom must be supported by exigent circumstances. The trial court determined that
exigent circumstances did in fact justify further entry, concluding that "Officer Knight was
justified in conducting a security sweep of the apartment because of his concerns that arose
when he saw Ms. Karren inside the apartment." R. 104: f 5; accord R. 89. In its
memorandum decision, the court held that "the narrow scope of Officer Knight's lawful entry
was properly broadened when he observed the woman that he had first met when he arrived
at the scene, [Ms. Karren], walking from the bedroom in the apartment." R. 89. The court
explained that "[d]ue to [Karren's] nervous demeanor and the possibility that others might
16

be present in the apartment[,] Officer Knight reasonably believed that either he or the alleged
victim (whose whereabouts was unclear to Officer Knight) could have been exposed to
potential danger." R 89

I he coiirt thus concluded that "Officer Knight's decision to

conduct a 'protective sweep"" of the apartment [ ] becai i le at i appropi iate and necessary
security measure , to protect the officer and others, and to ascertain whether the victim had
come back to the apartment and was injured." R. 89.
On appeal nfeleiulamt .n^urs ih.it lb dull i ouil mcil mi \ mu'linlniu thai (lie officer's
sweep of the premises was justified, contending that neither the protective sweep doctrine
nor the exigent circumstances doctrine applied under the circumstances here. Aplt. Brf. at
12-21, 27-31 Foi the reasons explained below defendant ^ iieniiienl i iiiiiis
"Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of
criminal wrongdoing, [the U.S. Supreme Court] has said that reasonableness generally
requites the obfaimni?, ol a |ueln i.il wanaitt " Veronia School District 4"\ t \\ Acton,51 5 II S
646, 653, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2390 (1995).

However, under the exigent eitenmsiani es

exception, a warrant is not required if the circumstances "involvef ] a plausible claim of
specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need, i.e., 'exigent circumstances.'" Illinois
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331, 121 S.Ct. 946, 950 (2001). In these einajmstanee-. - ihe
exigencies of the situation' make the need of law enforcement so compelling that the
vvjiTiiiitless search is ob)eetne!\ ieasonable." Minceyv. Arizona, 4 W 11 S 385, 3i)3-l>4, *)S
S.Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978) {quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 I J.S 451. 456, 69 S.Ct.
191,193(1948)).
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This Court has defined "[e]xigent circumstances [as] those "'that would cause a
reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the
officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or
some other consequence improperlyfrustratinglegitimate law enforcement efforts."' State
v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah App. 1993) {quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d
1195, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101 (1984)); accord State v.
Wells, 928 P.2d 386,389 (Utah App. 1996), aff'd, 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997) (holding that
the court of appeals' "analysis of the motion to suppress is correct"). The courts have
identified a number of variant situations that fall within the exigent circumstances exception,
including the "emergency aid" doctrine, see Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT 12, ff 1013,27,994 P.2d 1283, the "hot pursuit" doctrine, see State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131,113335 (Utah App. 1991), and the "community caretaker" doctrine, see Provo City v. Warden,
844 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah App. 1992), aff'd, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994) (affirming "for the
reasons stated by the court of appeals"). The weaponsfrisk,authorized under Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), and the protective sweep, authorized under Maryland v.
Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093 (1990), are also appropriately treated as falling within
the general rubric of exigent circumstances. See United States v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231,23738 (5th Cir. 2002) (analyzing protective sweep based on exigencies of situation) O fBrien v.
City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 1994) (classifying the "stop andfrisk"as
an exigent circumstance).
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In assessing exigent circumstances, courts employ a balancing test "rather than [ ] a
per se rule of unreasonableness." McArthur, 121 S.Ct. at 950. The Court "balance[s] the
privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was
reasonable." ld\ accord Bun "; 494 U.S. at 331, 11C S.C at 1096; Te? ry, 392 I f.S ; it 20-21,
88 S.Ct. at 1879-80. "'While exigent circumstances have multiple characteristics, the
guiding principle is reasonableness, and each case must be examined in the light of facts
kiinnri 'not'ii', ,r* A1 ("if Mmi "Itin- utietl "n ( ityt)tth\*m

\ Hvvtw

HnX P Id 13K4. 1391

(Utah App. 1994) {quoting State v. Hert, 220 Neb. ^4;, j /o N. W.2d 166,170 (Neb. 1985)).
The trial court here correctly concluded that the exigencies facing Officer Knight at
ilie Hint1" iiislilk'd ilit1 cursory mspeuinn * 1 licl :t u as ain led at protecting the officers as well
as the victim.

Umvu Knight had received information from Karren <

violent

confrontation between defendant and Layne. R, 168: 6-7, 21, Then, when Officer Knight
asked defendant to step outside so that he could investigate the complaint, defendant refused
to exit the apartment. R. 168: 7-10. 22
complied with the officer's request

Finall) after ten i i lii itiites of coaxing, defendant

R 168: 11. Against this backdrop, Officer Knight

returned to the apartment to lock the dooi

R 168: 14-16, 59

At that juncture, Officer

Knight was only justified in entering the apartmnit h ihr extent nocrssaiv in -;o uiv the
doors. However, the seemingly stabilized situation turned when Karren unexpectedly
emerged from the bedroom.
Although Kaii'cn explainedtluit she hail ,ta\\M tliit: ni^hl itnd ivliinuul lo icfnni\e her
coat, she was very nervous. R. 167: 11; R. 168: 17. Her nervous behavior was inconsistent
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with lawful conduct under the circumstances. Indeed, she would have no reason to be
nervous if she was rightfully in the apartment or if she was otherwise doing nothing
unlawful. Yet, Karren was more nervous than when she first reported the assault. R. 167:
11.
Officer Knight testified that the nature of the dispute also contributed to his concerns.
R. 167:34-3 5. He testified that "[djomestic situations can be the most violent situations" that
officers confront. R. 168: 45. This testimony is consistent with the pronouncements of the
courts. This court has "acknowledged that 'a domestic violence complaint' is 'one of the
most potentially dangerous, volatile arrest situations confronting police.'" State v. Comer,
2002 UT App 219,J 25, 51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Richards, 779 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah
App. 1989)). As noted by the First Circuit, "violence may be lurking and explode with little
warning." Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 1999); see also State v.
Greene, 784 P.2d 257, 259 (Ariz. 1989) (noting that domestic violence calls "commonly
involve dangerous situations in which the possibility for physical harm or damage escalates
rapidly").
While defendant's arrest may, to the untrained observer, appear to have eliminated
any concerns for the safety of the victim or the officers, the record demonstrates that Officer
Knight was still faced with many unknowns. For example, Layne ran awayfromthe scene
before she could be interviewed. R. 167: 53; R. 168:14-15,47. As a result, police never had
an opportunity to assess her welfare. This case is therefore unlike State v. Davis, 666 P.2d
802 (Ore. 1983), cited by defendant. See Aplt. Brf. at 29-30. As noted by defendant, the
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victim in Davis calmly exited the motel room and did not appear frightened. See Aplt. Brf.
at 30 (citing Davis, 666 P.2d at 804). Consequently, officers were able to determine that the
victim was unharmed. See Davis, 666 P 2d at 804

In contrast, Layne fled the scene.

OfficersKi J - indBeauehaitit1 t i n n h.nl innppnrlunil'i Imletrmnnclhc nalun and t*\lrm
of Layne's injuries.
Officer Beauchaine further testified that a second woman, whose identity was not
Is now n tlso i.iii horn Ihr ti'Milttinil il llic lime 1 d\m% I led Si #• K Ih ' SI

\\w ntiiiets

never had an opportunity to interview her or determine her role in the assault. Therefore,
they did not know whether she was the second victim in the reported assault or an
aeaiiinipliet: in Hit is^iull

\\ In n K.

ae apartment, the officers could

reasonably infer that the victim or an accomplice might also have returned.
Defendant asks this Court to summarily dismiss the officers' concerns, arguing that
nothing suggests that others might be present, including Layne, or that Layne was in need
of immediate assistance at all. This conclusion discounts the circumstance > discussed!1 ,\h n c
and ignores the training and experience of the police officers. "Police officers by virtue of
their experience and training can sometimes recognize illegal activity [and dangerous
circumstances] where ordinary citizens would not ' SVr ShKc " I ' V / \ H , 7 *l i} 2 I 1085,
1088 (Utah 1986). Accordingly, u[s]ome recognition should appropriately be given to that
experience and training where (as here) there are objective facts to justify the ultimate
conclusion." I J

r

\ntl undoubtedly addinp

apartment was dark. See R. 167: 35; R. 168: 33-34.
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Defendant disputes the court's finding that Officer Knight conducted the security
sweep in part to verify that the victim had not returned. Aplt. Brf. at 28-29. Defendant
claims that the finding was clearly erroneous because Officer Knight did not mention the
concern at the preliminary hearing and knew the victim was gone. Defendant, however,
ignores that the trial court expressly found the officer "to be credible/' R. 86. As observed
in Mogen, this Court will "defer to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility." 2002
UT App 235, at f 16. Moreover, the officers did not know where the victim had gone, and
therefore, they could not discount the possibility that the victim had returned unbeknownst
to the officers, just as Karren returned to the apartment unbeknownst to the officers. Given
this real possibility, the officers were justified in checking the apartment to determine
whether she had returned, and if so, to render whatever aid she might need.
In support of his claim that Officer Knight was not justified in conducting a cursory
sweep of the apartment, defendant cites to four cases which rejected the government's claim
that a search was justified as a protective sweep: Brown v. State, 738 P.2d 1092 (Wyo. 1987);
Hayes v. State, 797 P.2d 962 (Nev. 1990); United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560 (10th
Cir. 1992); and United States v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1969). Aplt. Brf. at 16-20.
These cases are distinguishable. In Brown, officers conducted a sweep of the home in the
course of executing a two-year-old arrest warrant for a traffic citation. 738 P.2d at 1093. In
Hayes, officers conducted a sweep in the course of arresting the defendant for stealing an
automobile a month before. 797 P.2d at 964. And in Baca, officers conducted a sweep of
the appellants' home in the course of arresting them for parole violations. 417 F.2d at 104.
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Thus, unlike the situation here, police in Brown, Hayes, and Baca were not confronted with
a recently perpetrated crime of violence, the full impact of which remained uncertain. They
were making arrests for cr ii nes tl lat were remote in tin i le ai 1 :! did not involve violence.
Finally, in Anderson, officers conducted the sweep of defendant's home not because they
were concerned for their safety, but because they were concerned that those inside the house
might destroy evidence. 981 F.2dat 1563. As explained above, Officer Knight's sweep was
prompted by a concern for the safety of himself and the victii i it , i lot by a desire to preserve
evidence.

As the decisions in Terry ami linh' make .."leai", officers air allow t\i lo lake reasonable
measures to ensure their safety and the safety of others as they perform their lawful duties.
As in Terry and Buie, Officer Knight did not conduct the limited search in a quest for

before him, Officer Knight reasonably believed that the sweep was "necessary to prevent
physical harm" to himself and the victim. See Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 (internal quotes
omitted)

When t nutronled v illii illit' unexpected presence of karren in Ihe apartment, her

unusually nervous demeanor, the volatile nature of domestic disputes, and the information
still unknown to him, Officer Knight reasonably believed that someone else might be in the
a p a r t m e n t , r it tin JUI a »\aitatit in tin1 i lelim

1 he trial \ ouil Iheielnie c o n e i l l y e o m !u«lint that

Officer Knight was justified in conducting the cursory inspection of the apartment.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted this Jjft^day of December, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

^JEFFREY S. GRAY
-Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee
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Addendum A

Addendum A

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

SEP 12 2001

IN THE DISTRICT COURT 07 THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE 8TATI OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 001919867

vs.
ALBERT 6R08SI,
Defendant.

The parties appeared before the Court for a hearing on May 16,
2001,

in connection with the defendant's Motion to Suppress for

Illegal Search and Seizure. The Court heard testimony from several
witnesses and received exhibits consisting of photographs which
were offered by the defense* At the conclusion of the hearing, the
Court ordered a transcript of the hearing to be prepared and gave
the parties an opportunity to submit supplemental memoranda on the
pending Motion to Suppress.

On June 19, 2001, the Court extended

the briefing schedule for the supplemental memoranda. On June 27,
2001,

the parties appeared before the Court for the purpose of

presenting argument on the Motion to Suppress. At the conclusion
of that hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement.
The Court has now had an opportunity to review a transcript of
the May 16, 2001, hearing, and a transcript of the preliminary
hearing held on March 20, 2001, before Judge William W. Barrett.

STATE V. 6R0SSI
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The Court has also reviewed the exhibits offered during the May 16,
2001, hearing, examined the numerous legal authorities cited by
counsel in support of their respective positions and considered the
testimony and argument offered during the hearings of May 16, 2001,
and July 17, 2001. The Court now renders this Decision, based on
the analysis set forth herein.
LEGAL AMALYfllfl
The defendant challenges the legality of his arrest and the
police entry into his apartment, where incriminating materials were
discovered, allegedly in plain view* The defendant argues that the
police did not have the jprobable cause to arrest him because he had
not committed any crime in their presence and that he had no
obligation to allow the police to enter his home.

The defendant

also contends that subsequent to an illegal arrest, the police
unlawfully

entered

his

home

and

performed

an

unauthorized

"protective sweep."
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the requirement of
probable cause with respect to a warrantless arrest by stating
that, "'The determination should be made on an objective standard:
whether from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences
which fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent
person in his position would be justified in believing that the
suspect had committed the offense.'" (Emphasis added.)

State v.
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Colfi, 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Hatcher. 27
Utah 2d 318, 320, 495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1972) (footnote omitted)).
In performing hie duties, the officer "is not required to meet any
such standard of perfection as to demand an absolutely certain
judgment before he may act." State v. Eastmond. 28 Utah 2d 129,
132, 499 P.2d 276, 278 (1972) (footnote omitted).

Requiring a

police officer to be absolutely certain and perfect, would mean
that the ability of the police to protect the citizenry would be
hampered to the point of rendering police protection generally
unavailable.
In applying the objective standard articulated in Cole, this
Court finds that the facts and circumstances in this case provided
a reasonable basis for Officer Knight to conclude that the
defendant

had

committed

a

crime* when

he

arrested

him.

Specifically, Officer Knight's testimony at the hearing on the
Motion to Suppress, which this Court found to be credible, (based
upon his appearance, demeanor and words) indicated that he was
dispatched to the defendant's apartment because of a call that came
in about a "male • . . assaulting two females." (Transcript of
Motion to Suppress Hearing at p. 5). When Officer Knight arrived
at the scene, he wasffigtbyfttV*T\%JQ womqn wft<? wag "yelling" ^bout
her pregnant friend being beaten, and being dragged down the stairs
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When Officer Knight approached the door to the apartment, he
testified that he could see the defendant through a glass panel in
the door, but could not see the alleged victim.

Officer Knight

testified that although he repeatedly asked the defendant to open
the <fo<?r so that he could verify the safety of the alleged victim.

the tiefendant refuged*
Under these circumstances and particularly in light of the
information that Officer Knight had received about imminent harm to
a pregnant woman, who was being beaten in the apartment;

Officer

Knight reasonably concluded that an assault had taken place and
that the defendant was obstructing the officer's efforts to
investigate and to prevent any further abuse of the alleged victim
and assure her

afety.

This Court concludes that Officer Knight

had sufficient cause to arrest the defendant when the defendant
finally opened the door, after refusals and verbal reports of
imminent danger, safety concerns about an alleged vulnerable victim
and the defendant's unwillingness to open his door to speak to the
police until considerable delay had occurred, make this clear. It
is important to note the police were called to the scene (a
distress call) and advised of criminal acts.

The defendant

initially refused to open the door and the alleged victim was not
in view.

Her safety was an issue requiring resolution.

The
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defendant's Motion to Suppress on the basis of an illegal arrest is
denied.
The Court next considers the legality of Officer Knight's
entry into the defendant's apartment.

The defendant focuses on a

discrepancy in the testimony concerning Officer Knight's decision
to secure the defendant's apartment. Officer Knight testified that
he attempted
defendant.

to secure the apartment at the request of the

Another witness who testified, Audrey Robbins, stated

that she heard the defendant ask to secure the apartment.

As the

State points out in its briefing, this discrepancy is irrelevant
because even if the defendant had asked to re-enter his apartment
for the

purpose

of

securing

it, Officer Knight

could have

reasonably refused this request, both for his safety and the safety
of the other officers and granted the request by securing the
premises for the defendant.

Moreover, in reviewing the testimony

of both Officer Knight and Ms. Robbins, it is clear to the Court
that both heard the defendant communicate a need to secure his
apartment before he was taken to jail. This Court finds that once
the defendant conveyed this need, Officer Knight lawfully entered
the apartment for the purpose of locating the key to the front door
(the only means of locking the door).
Furthermore, the narrow scope of Officer Knight's lawful entry
was properly broadened when he observed the woman that he had first
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met when he arrived at the scene, Shandra, walking from the bedroom
in the apartment.

Due to Shandra*s nervous demeanor and the

possibility that others might be present in the apartment; Officer
Knight reasonably believed that either he or the alleged victim
(whose whereabouts was unclear to Officer Knight) could have been
exposed to potential danger inside the apartment.

Officer

Knight's decision to conduct a "protective sweep" of the apartment
therefore became an appropriate and necessary security measure, to
protect the officer and others, and to ascertain whether the victim
had come back to the apartment and was injured.

Accordingly, the

Court

the

concludes

that

Officer

Knight

entered

defendant's

apartment lawfully (i.e., by a request), to secure the apartment (a
need which the defendant himself communicated), and that Officer
Knight was justified in conducting a protective sweep of the
apartment, under the facts indicated, once he was inside.

The

Court therefore denies the defendant's Motion to Suppress in the
entirety.
The Court notes that while it is vital to protect a citizen's
right to privacy and to be free from unlawful arrests and searches;
a police officer must have the ability to protect the public when
a serious crime to a person is reported to be occurring and the
officer finds reason for concern upon arrival.

The officer would

have been remiss if he ignored the report of a crime without
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conducting son* investigation to assure the safety of the alleged
victim. When he encountered interference and/or obstruction in his
investigation, his actions were warranted, as articulated above.
Credible police officer testimony has been relied upon by this
Court in making this assessment.
Counsel for the State is to prepare an Order consistent with,
but not limited to, this Memorandum Decision and submit the same to
the Court for review and signature.

n f^—

Dated this / *m&v of September ,/2 001»

JLII A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this \ 3, day of
September, 2001:

Lana Taylor
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Robert Breeze
Attorney for Defendant
213 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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District Attorney for Salt Lake County
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No. 7642
Deputy District Attorney
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-v

Case No. 001919867FS
ALBERT GROSSI,
Judge LESLIE LEWIS
Defendant.
This matter came on for a Motion to Suppress hearing on May 16, 2001, and July
27, 2001, before the Court, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge, presiding. The
State was represented by Lana Taylor, Deputy District Attorney. The Defendant was
present and represented by Robert Breeze. Evidence was presented in the form of
testimonyfromwitnesses for both the State and the defense. The Court, based upon the
evidence and argument presented at the hearings, the memorandums of law submitted by
counsel, and for good cause shown, makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On November 16, 2000, Officer Jason Knight of the Salt Lake Police

Department responded to a dispatch call of a male assaulting two females.
2.

When Officer Knight arrived on the scene, the informationfromdispatch

was confirmed by one of the female victims, Chandra Karren, who told Officer Knight

l

that the second victim, Andrea Layne was dragged down the stairs by the defendant and
forced inside his apartment.
3.

Officer Knight knocked on the defendant's apartment and spoke with the

defendant through the closed door.
4.

Officer Knight asked the Defendant to open the door, so he could check on

the welfare of Ms. Layne.
5.

The defendant refused Officer Knight's numerous requests to open the

6.

When the defendantfinallyopened the door, Officer Knight arrested the

door.

defendant for interfering with a police investigation.
7.

After the defendant was arrested and seated in a patrol car, the defendant

said that he wanted his apartment locked up and secured.
8.

Officer Knight went back to the apartment to lock the door because the

defendant was in custody.
9.

Officer Knight stepped inside the apartment to look for a key so he could

lock the door and saw Ms. Karren walk out of the bedroom.
10.

Officer Knight then did a quick security check of the apartment to make

sure no one else was in the apartment and to make sure that Ms. Layne had not re-entered
the apartment through the cellar door.
11.

When Officer Knight looked inside the bedroom where Ms. Karren had

come from, he saw what he believed to be controlled substances and drug paraphernalia
laying out in the open.

2

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Officer Knight reasonably believed that the defendant had been involved

in a domestic assault and was justified in asking the defendant to exit his apartment so he
could check on the victim's welfare.
2.

Officer Knight had probable cause to believe that the defendant had

committed the offense of interfering with an investigation because he refused to open the
door and comply with the officer's lawful command.
3.

The defendant was lawfully arrested when he exited the apartment.

4.

Officer Knight was justified in entering the defendant's apartment to lock

the door because the defendant wanted the apartment secured, but was unable to do it
himself as a result of his arrest.
5.

Officer Knight was justified in conducting a security sweep of the

apartment because of his concerns that arose when saw Ms. Karren inside the apartment.
6.

Officer Knight was in the defendant's apartment lawfully when he saw

what he believed to be controlled substances and drug paraphernalia laying out in the
open.
7.

The evidence in this case was lawfully seized pursuant to the plain view

3

doctrine

.

DATED this ^ - d a y o f

/JxQ

^2001
BY THE COURT

Approved as to Form:

Robert Breeze
Attorney for Defendant
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No. 7642
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 2 3 2001
MTY
By-

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

-v.Case No. 001919867FS
ALBERT GROSSI,
Judge LESLIE LEWIS
Defendant.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress for Illegal
Search and Seizure is denied.
DATED this
is oj J day of

f

,2001.

BY THE

Approved as to Form:

Robert Breeze
Attorney for Defendant

